

## Message Text

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ACTION ACDA-10

INFO OCT-01 EUR-12 ISO-00 ACDE-00 ERDA-07 CIAE-00 H-02

INR-07 IO-10 L-02 NSAE-00 OIC-02 OMB-01 PA-02 PM-03

PRS-01 SAJ-01 SAM-01 SP-02 SS-15 USIA-15 TRSE-00

NSC-05 BIB-01 /100 W

----- 074975

P R 181330Z APR 75

FM USDEL MBFR VIENNA

TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0971

SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY

INFO USMISSION NATO

AMEMBASSY BONN

AMEMBASSY LONDON

USNMR SHAPE

USCINCEUR

UNCLAS SECTION 1 OF 2 MBFR VIENNA 0200

FROM US REP MBFR

E.O. 11652: N/A

TAGS: PARM, NATO

SUBJECT: MBFR NEGOTIATIONS: STRULAK APRIL 17, 1975 PRESS CONFERENCE  
QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS

SUMMARY: AFTER PREPARED PRESS STATEMENT (MBFR VIENNA 0193),  
STRULAK, BY HIS OWN ADMISSION, WAS "HARD PRESSED" BY  
WESTERN NEWSMEN. QUESTIONS FOCUSED ON EASTERN UNWILLINGNESS  
TO EXCHANGE DATA, BUT ALSO USED TEXT OF STRULAK STATEMENT  
TO ELICIT SPECIFIC EXPLANATIONS ON VARIOUS ISSUES. MANY  
OF QUESTIONS ASKED REFLECTED ALLIED EFFORTS TO GET MEDIA  
TO UNDERSTAND WESTERN CONCERN ABOUT EASTERN POSITIONS AT  
TALKS. IN COMPARISON TO OTHER STRULAK BRIEFINGS, HIS APRIL 17  
PERFORMANCE WAS POOR. PRESSURE PUT ON HIM BY NEWSMEN  
OCCASIONALLY RESULTED IN IMPATIENT TONE OF RESPONSE. Q'S  
AND A'S FOLLOW. END SUMMARY.  
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STRULAK APRIL 17, 1975 PRESS CONFERENCE, Q'S AND A'S.

1. Q. (FINANCIAL TIMES): MR AMBASSADOR, THERE IS A PARAGRAPH IN  
YOUR STATEMENT, AND I WOULD LIKE TO ASK YOU TWO OR THREE QUESTIONS IN

CONNECTION WITH PAGE 5. YOU SAID "WE ARE SURPRISED BY THE STRESS EVIDENTLY PUT BY SOME WESTERN COUNTRIES ON A REDUCTION ARRANGEMENT UNDER THE SO-CALLED COMMON CEILING WHICH WOULD EVENTUALLY ENABLE THEM TO INCREASE THEIR FORCES." I DON'T QUITE KNOW WHAT YOU MEAN BY "SOME WESTERN COUNTRIES"; WE HAVE BEEN TOLD AT BRIEFINGS THAT THIS IS A NATO POSITION. DO YOU IMPLY THAT THERE IS A SPLIT IN THE ALLIANCE ON THIS ISSUE? AND THE SECOND QUESTION IS: YOU SAID "WHICH WOULD EVENTUALLY ENABLE THEM TO INCREASE THEIR FORCES". COULD YOU AMPLIFY ON THIS? AND THEN YOU MENTION, MR AMBASSADOR, IN THE LAST SENTENCE OF THAT PARAGRAPH, THAT "WE BELIEVE THAT NO PARTY THESE NEGOTIATIONS SHOULD TAKE STEPS TO UNDERMINING THE MUTUAL CONFIDENCE". WHAT EXACTLY DO YOU MEAN BY THAT?

A. I WOULD ANSWER YOUR QUESTIONS ONE BY ONE. AS TO THE FIRST QUESTION, THE CONCERNS I HAVE CONVEYED TO YOU REPRESENT MY FEELINGS; THERE HAVE BEEN EVEN COMMENTS IN THE WESTERN PRESS, AND BY READING THE WESTERN PRESS, YOU CAN GUESS WHAT COUNTRIES - WHAT COUNTRY - I HAVE IN MIND. AS TO YOUR DESIRE FOR A CLARIFICATION WHAT I MEAN WHEN I SAY THAT THEY WOULD BE ABLE TO INCREASE THEIR FORCES EVENTUALLY, BY WHICH I MEAN EVEN AFTER THE REDUCTION AGREEMENT , THIS MEANS THAT THERE IS A DEMAND ON THE PART OF THE WESTERN STATES NOT FOR OBLIGATIONS BY STATES, AT LEAST NOT BY ALL THE STATES, NOT INDIVIDUAL OBLIGATIONS BY ALL STATES, BUT SOME STATES MAY TAKE OBLIGATIONS OF A COLLECTIVE, OR YOU MAY SAY BLOC CHARACTER. SUCH AN OBLIGATION WOULD ALLOW A PARTICULAR COUNTRY TO INCREASE THEIR FORCES. THAT MEANS THAT UNDER SUCH AN ARRANGEMENT WE ARE ASKED NOT TO BE CONCERNED WITH THE SITUATION IF FOLLOWING THE REDUCTION AGREEMENT A PARTICULAR COUNTRY IN WESTERN EUROPE RAISES ITS FORCES. AND I THINK THAT ALSO ANSWERS BY POINT ABOUT THE STEPS TO UNDERMINE MUTUAL CONFIDENCE. IN OUR JUDGEMENT SUCH A STEP WOULD WORK IN THIS DIRECTION.

2. Q. (NEW YORK TIMES) MR AMBASSADOR, YOU SPELLED OUT IN DETAIL THE TIMETABLE FOR THE PROPOSAL OF YOUR SIDE, WHICH INCLUDES UNCLASSIFIED

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REDUCTIONS POSSIBLY EVEN BEFORE THE END OF THE FIRST HALF OF 1975. NOW THAT YOU ARE RETURNING ONLY MAY 12 TO RESUME THESE NEGOTIATIONS WHICH YOU SAY ARE BLOCKED BY THE WESTERN SIDE, DO YOU HAVE ANY HOPE OF BEGINNING ANY KIND OF REDUCTION IN 1975?

A. WELL, WHAT TIME REMAINS, WE ARE STILL STRESSING THAT REDUCTIONS SHOULD START IN 1975. IT HAS BEEN IN OUR PLAN. IT REMAINS IN OUR PLAN, EVEN THOUGH UNDOUBTEDLY TIME IS RUNNING ON.

3. Q. (AUSTRIAN PRESS AGENCY) WOULD YOU COMMENT, MR AMBASSADOR, ON THE QUESTION THAT IN ANOTHER FORM, THE WESTERN STATES HAVE ALSO PUT FORWARD A PROPOSAL ON NON-INCREASE OF THEIR FORCES, THAT WAS DURING THE PAST YEAR. WOULD YOU COMMENT ON THAT PROPOSAL?

A. YES. I THINK YOU HAVE BEEN INFORMED ABOUT THAT PROPOSAL. THIS IS A PROPOSAL WHICH IS A VERY DIFFERENT ONE FROM OUR OWN PROPOSAL FOR A NON-INCREASE. NAMELY, THE READINESS TO MAKE A COMMITMENT NOT TO INCREASE THE FORCES OF THE WESTERN EUROPEAN STATES IS DEPENDENT ON THE ACCEPTANCE OF THE WESTERN SCHEME OF REDUCTION BY THE SOCIALIST STATES. THAT MEANS WE SHOULD FIRST AGREE ON THE ASYMMETRICAL REDUCTIONS, ON TWO-PHASED REDUCTIONS. EXEMPTION FROM REDUCTION OF THE EUROPEAN STATES FOR A CONSIDERABLE PERIOD OF TIME, AND ONLY THEN WOULD THE WESTERN STATES BE READY TO UNDERTAKE A FREEZE AGREEMENT. THE SECOND POINT IS THAT, AGAIN, THIS WOULD BE A FREEZE AGREEMENT WHICH WOULD HAVE A BLOC CHARACTER, AND WHICH WOULD ACTUALLY NOT PREVENT PARTICULAR WESTERN STATES FROM INCREASING THEIR FORCES EVEN THOUGH THIS COMMITMENT IS TAKEN. WELL, OUR COMMITMENT IS OF COURSE A PRELIMINARY COMMITMENT. IT IS NOT A COMMITMENT INSTEAD OF REDUCTIONS. IT IS A PRELIMINARY COMMITMENT BEFORE AN AGREEMENT ON REDUCTIONS.

4. Q. (KURIER) BUT THIS AGREEMENT IS NOT ANYMORE SOMEHOW A CONDITIO SINE QUA NON FOR THE REDUCTIONS. I MEAN THE NO-INCREASE COMMITMENT.

A. YOU MEAN OURS? IT HAS NEVER BEEN ON THE CONDITION OF A SINE QUA NON. WE HAVE OFFERED SEVERAL BASES FOR DISCUSSIONS, FOR MUTUAL NEGOTIATION AND ACCEPTANCE. WE HAVE NEVER USED THE WORDS CONDITIO SINE QUA NON.

5. (REUTERS) ON THE QUESTION OF CONDITIONS; ON PAGE 6, WHERE UNCLASSIFIED

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YOU LIST THE VARIOUS PROPOSALS, YOU SAY THAT THE INITIAL REDUCTION STEP PROPOSAL REMAINS AS A SEPARATE ONE, SHOULD THIS BE PREFERABLE "TO OUR WESTERN PARTNERS". BUT DOES IT NOT REMAIN THE CASE YOU YOU WOULD STILL REQUIRE A PRIOR COMMITMENT BY ALL THE DIRECT PARTICIPANTS TO REDUCE?

A. THE INITIAL REDUCTION PROPOSAL HAS, SO TO SAY, MERITS OF ITS OWN. IT CAN BE TAKEN AS PART OF THE GENERAL PLAN OF REDUCTIONS, AND HERE I WOULD LIKE TO STRESS ONE ADDITIONAL POINT, NAMELY THAT WE HAVE KIND OF ENVELOPED IN OUR GENERAL PLAN -- IN DEFERENCE ALSO TO THE VOICES IN THE WEST THAT WE MEAN ONLY PARTIAL AND NOT SUBSTANTIAL REDUCTIONS -- WE ARE ANSWERING THAT WE MEAN BOTH, INITIAL AND SUBSTANTIAL. ALSO, WE ARE READY TO SPEAK ABOUT THE FINAL OUTCOME WHICH STEMS FROM THE GENERAL PLAN. BUT, AS I SAID, THE INITIAL REDUCTION STEP HAS MERITS ON ITS OWN, AND WE COULD DISCUSS IT SEPARATELY AND DISCUSS JUST THE OBLIGATIONS WHICH WE PROPOSE AS REDUCTION OBLIGATIONS FOR AN INITIAL STEP. SO WE WOULD ABSTRACT OURSELVES FROM THE OTHER PLAN. SO THERE IS AN ALTERNATIVE APPROACH. (BY THE INITIAL STEP YOU MEAN SOVIET-AMERICAN REDUCTIONS.) NO. IF YOU TAKE A LOOK YOU WILL SEE THAT THERE IS A CERTAIN SEQUENCE, AND ALSO CERTAIN PROPORTIONS. EARLIER AND LARGER REDUCTIONS BY THE US AND SOVIET UNION. (THIS REMAINS ONE PROPOSAL.) IT REMAINS AS A SEPARATE

PROPOSAL IF IT IS PREFERRED TO BE TAKEN THIS WAY.

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NSC-05 BIB-01 /100 W

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P R 181330Z APR 75

FM USDEL MBFR VIENNA

TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0972

SECDEF WASHDC

INFO USMISSION NATO

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FROM US REP MBFR

IF IT IS PREFERRED TO BE TAKEN AS A PART OF THE WHOLE, IT  
ALSO STANDS AS SUCH.

6. Q. (FINANCIAL TIMES) MR. AMBASSADOR, UNDER YOUR ESTIMATES,  
DO YOU SEE THE FORCE LEVELS IN CENTRAL EUROPE, WEST AND  
EAST, AS HAVING INCREASED IN ANY WAY SINCE THE TALKS BEGAN  
IN OCTOBER OF 1973? IF THEY HAVE, COULD YOU SAY IN WHAT  
WAY?

A. AS YOU KNOW, WE DEAL HERE MAINLY WITH THE PROBLEMS OF  
REDUCTION. BUT OF COURSE WE DO NOT REMAIN INDIFFERENT TO  
REPORTS ABOUT FACTS WHICH HAVE REFERENCE TO OUR TALKS,  
AND WHICH CAN HAVE INFLUENCE ON OUR TALKS. I SHOULD  
REMIND YOU THAT IN SOME OF THE MEETINGS WE HAD EARLIER WE  
DISCUSSED THE MATTER OF SOME NEWS ABOUT REINFORCEMENT OF  
WESTERN FORCES IN THE FRG. OF COURSE, WE ARE NOT  
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INDIFFERENT TO THAT. (HAS THE BALANCE BECOME LESS FAVORABLE  
AS A RESULT? IF YOU SPOKE ABOUT AN EXISTING EQUILIBRIUM,

HAS IT TILTED EITHER WAY?) I WOULDN'T GO INTO THE DETAILS OF AN EVALUATION; THAT WOULD BE ABIT DIFFICULT. BUT OF COURSE, THESE KINDS OF MOVES HAVE TO BE EVALUATED WITH THE FACTORS INVOLVED.

7. Q (NYT) IN THE LIST OF PROPOSALS YOU HAVE ON PAGE 6, AND THIS IS A QUESTION OF TERMINOLOGY, YOU SAID THAT YOUR DRAFT AGREEMENT OF NOVEMBER 1973 "AS NOW AMENDED AND COMPLETED". DOES THAT MEAN YOU ARE STANDING ON THIS AND WILL NOT AMEND THE AGREEMENT ANY MORE? WHAT IS THE MEANING OF THE WORD "COMPLETED" IN THIS SENSE?

A. COMPLETED MEANS WE HAVE ADDED SOMETHING. (WOULD YOU STILL BE OPEN TO FURTHER AMENDMENTS? OR HAS THAT BEEN -) THAT IS TOO MUCH TO ASK, THAT IS TO SAY. AS I SAID, WE HAVE OFFERED OUR PROPOSALS AS A BASIS FOR DISCUSSION ON THAT SUBJECT AT ALL TIMES.

8. Q. (THE ECONOMIST) YOU SAID A MINUTE AGO IN RESPONSE TO THE FORCE LEVEL QUESTION THAT YOU SEE SOME REINFORCEMENT OF WESTERN FORCES SINCE THE REDUCTION TALKS BEGAN. BUT YOU SEE NO SIGNIFICANT CHANGE RELATIVELY. DOES THAT MEAN THAT THERE HAS ALSO BEEN A SIGNIFICANT WARSAW PACT REFORCEMENT DURING THAT PERIOD?

A. MAY BE YOU HAVE SOME SORT OF INFORMATION. I HAVE NONE TO THIS EFFECT. I HAVE NO SOURCES OF INFORMATION AS FAR AS THIS IS CONCERNED. I DON'T THINK THAT THERE HAS BEEN ANY DISCUSSION ABOUT THIS KIND OF MOVE.

9. Q. (JURIER) WOULD THERE BE ANY READINESS FROM THE WARSAW PACT STATES FOR A NON-INCREASE AMENDMENT WITH A DECLARATION OF THE NUMBER OF FORCES? THIS ALSO CONCERNS THE COMMON CEILING.

A. WOULD YOU BE MORE SPECIFIC. (WELL, IF YOU AGREE NOT TO INCREASE SOMETHING, YOU HAVE TO SAY HOW MUCH YOU HAVE.) WELL, I DON'T KNOW. MAY BE THIS IS EQUIVALENT TO SOME SORT OF GAMES, WHERE THE DATA ARE LARGELY UNKNOWN. I DON'T UNCLASSIFIED

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THINK THIS IS THE CASE WITH OUR NEGOTIATIONS.

10. Q. (DIE PRESSE) MR. AMBASSADOR; ON PAGE 5, SECOND PARA, YOU TALK ABOUT SO-CALLED "UNOBJECTIVE ARGUMENTS" BY THE WESTERN SIDE ABOUT DISPARITIES IN GROUND FORCES AND GEOGRPAHY. IN WHICH FORM CONCERNING PARTICULAR STEPS ON THE PART OF THE SOVIET UNION, TO INVEST MORE IN MUTUAL CONFIDENCE THROUGH PRIOR AND GREATER REDUCTIONS, DOESN'T THAT MEAN THAT THE EASTERN SIDE HAS A DE FACTO OVERWHELMING FORCE ON THEIR SIDE? YOU SAY THERE DOES NOT EXIST A DISPARITY IN FAVOR OF THE EASTERN SIDE?

A. I WOULDN'T DRAW SUCH CONCLUSIONS. (EQUAL PERCENTAGE OR NUMBERS REDUCTIONS, YOU SAY, WOULD RESULT IN GREATER REDUCTIONS ON THE EASTERN SIDE. DOES NOT THAT LOGICALLY MEAN THAT THERE MUST BE A DISPARITY IN FAVOR OF THE EASTERN SIDE?) WELL, THERE ARE TWO THINGS. FIRST, THE REDUCTIONS FOR ALL, THAT IS A SEQUENCE. GREATER REDUCTIONS WOULD RESULT BECAUSE THE SOVIET UNION REDUCES FIRST. BUT WITHIN THE PERIOD UP TO 1976, IT WILL BE PERCENTAGES. THAT MEANS, THE OTHERS WHO FOLLOW SUIT AFTER THE FIRST REDUCTION ALSO REDUCE CORRESPONDING TO THE NUMBERS THEY POSSESS, OF THEIR ARMIES IN THE AREA. OF COURSE, FROM THIS POINT OF VIEW, WE THINK THAT THE MEASURE WE PROPOSE IS EQUITABLE, BECAUSE WHOEVER HAS MORE FORCES IN THE AREA REDUCES MORE; WHO HAS FEWER FORCES REDUCES LESS. (DOES THAT APPLY TO ALL FORCES IN THE AREA? THE EAST HAS MORE FORCES IN THE AREA THAN THE WEST, HASN'T IT?) WELL, I THINK THAT IS LARGELY KNOWN, HOW MUCH WE HAVE. THAT IS NOT SO MUCH THE POINT. THE POINT IS TO AGREE HOW WE WILL REDUCE. (WELL, DOES THAT MEAN THAT YOU ACCEPT THE WESTERN FIGURES?) NO, IT DOESN'T. (WHAT ABOUT YOUR FIGURES?) WE DO NOT ACCEPT THE FIGURES. WE DO NOT, IF YOU ASK ME AND PRESS ME ABOUT THIS, WE DO NOT THINK THAT IT IS APPROPRIATE TO DISCUSS THE QUESTION OF FIGURES AT THIS STAGE OF OUR NEGOTIATIONS. THAT'S ONE POINT. WE THINK THAT FIRST WE SHOULD DECIDE ABOUT THE SIZE OF REDUCTIONS, ABOUT TIMING OF REDUCTIONS, MODALITY OF REDUCTIONS, AND THEN WHEN WE HAVE THIS AGREEMENT THERE COMES THE POINT OF FIGURES. I WOULD LIKE TO STRESS THAT THAT IS EXACTLY OUR APPROACH. WE ARE NOT SHUNNING THE QUESTION OF FIGURES. IF YOU TAKE OUR DRAFT AGREEMENT, UNCLASSIFIED

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YOU HAVE A PROVISION THERE ABOUT THE PROTOCOL TO ACCOMPANY THE AGREEMENT, WHERE ONE WILL NAME THE UNITS WHICH WILL BE REDUCED, THE NUMBER OF SOLDIERS WHICH ARE BEING REDUCED, THE NUMBER OF EQUIPMENT THAT IS BEING REDUCED, EVERYTHING. ALL THE FIGURES ARE THERE, WILL BE THERE. ON THE OTHER HAND, AS FAR AS FIGURES ARE CONCERNED, THERE IS DIFFERENT ASPECT TO IT, NAMELY WE HAVE SPECIFIED IN OUR DRAFT BY WHAT VOLUME, BY WHAT PERCENTAGE EACH COUNTRY WOULD REDUCE ITS FORCES. HOWEVER, UNTIL NOW WE DON'T KNOW HOW MUCH EACH OF THE WESTERN COUNTRIES IS PREPARED TO REDUCE ITS FORCES, BY WHAT PERCENTAGE. (MAY I ASK A FOLLOW-UP QUESTION: IF ONE DOESN'T KNOW THE ORIGINAL LEVEL, THAN WHAT IS FIVE PER CENT? OF WHAT?) THE POINT IS THAT WE KNOW THE ORIGINAL LEVELS. AS I SAID, THIS IS NOT THE QUESTION OF A GAME, WHEN YOU HAVE SOMETHING IN YOUR POCKET AND THE PARTNER CANNOT GUESS WHAT YOU HAVE. (MR AMBASSADOR, YOU SAY YOU KNOW THE ORIGINAL LEVELS. YOU ALSO SAY THAT YOU DO NOT ACCEPT THE ORIGINAL WESTERN ESTIMATES. THEN IT IS NOT QUITE CLEAR TO ME WHY YOU DO NOT GIVE YOUR OWN FIGURES.) WELL, YOU CAN SEE IF YOU JUDGE THE WESTERN ESTIMATES, YOU HAVE THERE

BASICALLY TWO FIGURES WHICH YOU HAVE BEEN TOLD THE OTHER DAY: 150,000 SUPPOSED SUPERIORITY OF THE WARSAW PACT AND SOME SUPERIORITY IN TANKS ALSO. ALLEGED SUPERIORITY. (COMMENT: ALLEGED WAS ADDED ON PRODDING OF PRESS ASSISTANT). BUT THERE IS MUCH MORE TO THE PICTURE OF THE MILITARY POTENTIAL IN THE AREA. THESE ARE NOT VALID FIGURES BY WHICH YOU CAN JUDGE THE RELATIONSHIP OF FORCES. I THINK IT IS MUCH MORE LOGICAL TO AGREE ON HOW MUCH YOU REDUCE, WHEN YOU REDUCE, IN WHAT DIRECTION, WHAT MODALITY, WHAT PERCENTAGES AND TIMING, AND THEN TO COME CONCRETELY TO THE FIGURES YOU REDUCE. AND AS FAR AS FOR EXAMPLE OUR INITIAL REDUCTION STEP IS CONCERNED, WHICH IS TO BE MORE OR LESS A CONCRETE AGREEMENT, WE HAVE GIVEN FIGURES.

11. Q. (WEST GERMAN RADIO) WHAT DO YOU SEE AS THE CORE OF THE PROBLEM HERE IN VIENNA. YOU HAVE MENTIONED VARIOUS ASPECTS, BUT WHAT IS REALLY THE MAIN POINT?

A. WELL, THERE IS MORE THAN ONE POINT. I COULD PROBABLY NAME FOUR, OR THREE POINTS. ALL SHOULD REFLECT ONE BASIC PRINCIPLE ON WHICH WE CAN AGREE, THE PRINCIPLE OF UN-  
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DIMINISHED SECURITY. ONE IS THAT WE WOULD AGREE ON SUCH REDUCTIONS WHICH WOULD NOT DIMINISH THE SECURITY OF ANY PARTICIPANT, NOT ASYMMETRICAL REDUCTIONS IN THE SENSE AS PROPOSED BY THE WEST. THE SECOND IS, AS THESE TALKS CONCERN THE SECURITY OF THE PARTIES, BEFORE WE EMBARK ON REDUCTIONS, WE SHOULD KNOW WHO REDUCES HOW MUCH, AND WHEN. THERE IS A TRUE RECIPROCITY OF OBLIGATIONS. AND THAT DOES NOT MEAN THAT ONLY TWO POWERS REDUCE, AND THEN YOU DISCUSS THE REDUCTION BY OTHERS. THE THIRD POINT IS THAT IT IS NOT ENOUGH IN ORDER TO HAVE A VIABLE REDUCTION AGREEMENT TO SPEAK ABOUT GROUND FORCES ALONE. YOU HAVE TO TAKE INTO CONSIDERATION THE NUCLEAR WEAPONS, WHICH ARE AN IMPORTANT FACTOR IN THE AREA, THE AIR FORCE, AN EXTREMELY IMPORTANT FACTOR IN THE AREA; ONE SHOULD TAKE INTO CONSIDERATION THE QUESTION OF ARMAMENTS, WHICH ARE A PARTICULAR PART OF THE SUBJECT OF THE AGREEMENT. AND FINALLY, AND THAT IS CONNECTED WITH POINT TWO, IT IS NOT POSSIBLE TO IMAGINE AN AGREEMENT WHICH WOULD ALLOW SOME COUNTRIES TO INCREASE THEIR FORCES AFTER THE REDUCTION AGREEMENT.

12. Q. (AP) I WANT TO CLARIFY THE POINT YOU MADE THAT SOME COUNTRIES WOULD HAVE THE CHANCE TO INCREASE THEIR FORCES. IS IT FAIR TO SAY THAT MAYBE YOU HAVE THE WEST GERMAN FORCES IN MIND?

A. WELL, I HAVE MENTIONED THE WEST GERMAN FORCES IN MY STATEMENT, BUT I DO NOT MEAN ANY PARTICULAR FORCES. THE FAIR APPROACH IS THAT THIS SHOULD APPLY TO ALL THE 11 COUNTRIES. AND OF COURSE, TAKING INTO ACCOUNT THEIR RELATIVE IMPORTANCE AND WEIGHT, YOU CAN COMPARE WHAT ARE OUR PRIORITIES.

I WOULD DRAW YOUR ATTENTION TO THE FACT THAT IN THE WESTERN  
APPROACH THERE IS A DEFINITE ACCENT ON THE REDUCTION OF  
SOVIET FORCES.

IF THERE ARE NOT OTHER QUESTIONS, I AM SORRY THAT I COULD  
NOT OFFER YOU ANY BETTER NEWS. BUT WE ARE NO PESSIMISTS.  
WE HAVE TO CONTINUE, AND NONE OF THE PARTNERS HERE IS  
DISCOURAGED, I THINK. WE FEEL WE ARE ENGAGED IN SOMETHING  
SERIOUS, IN SOMETHING PURPOSEFUL, AND WE SHOULD SUCCEED.  
END TEXT.RESOR

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## Message Attributes

**Automatic Decaptioning:** X  
**Capture Date:** 26 AUG 1999  
**Channel Indicators:** n/a  
**Current Classification:** UNCLASSIFIED  
**Concepts:** MBFR, MUTUAL FORCE REDUCTIONS, NEGOTIATIONS, PRESS CONFERENCES, MILITARY POLICIES  
**Control Number:** n/a  
**Copy:** SINGLE  
**Draft Date:** 18 APR 1975  
**Decaption Date:** 01 JAN 1960  
**Decaption Note:**  
**Disposition Action:** n/a  
**Disposition Approved on Date:**  
**Disposition Authority:** n/a  
**Disposition Case Number:** n/a  
**Disposition Comment:**  
**Disposition Date:** 01 JAN 1960  
**Disposition Event:**  
**Disposition History:** n/a  
**Disposition Reason:**  
**Disposition Remarks:**  
**Document Number:** 1975MBFRV00200  
**Document Source:** ADS  
**Document Unique ID:** 00  
**Drafter:** n/a  
**Enclosure:** n/a  
**Executive Order:** N/A  
**Errors:** n/a  
**Film Number:** D750136-0883  
**From:** MBFR VIENNA  
**Handling Restrictions:** n/a  
**Image Path:**  
**ISecure:** 1  
**Legacy Key:** link1975/newtext/t197504104/baaaatmf.tel  
**Line Count:** 391  
**Locator:** TEXT ON-LINE, TEXT ON MICROFILM  
**Office:** ACTION ACDA  
**Original Classification:** UNCLASSIFIED  
**Original Handling Restrictions:** n/a  
**Original Previous Classification:** n/a  
**Original Previous Handling Restrictions:** n/a  
**Page Count:** 8  
**Previous Channel Indicators:**  
**Previous Classification:** n/a  
**Previous Handling Restrictions:** n/a  
**Reference:** n/a  
**Review Action:** RELEASED, APPROVED  
**Review Authority:** ShawDG  
**Review Comment:** n/a  
**Review Content Flags:**  
**Review Date:** 08 JUL 2003  
**Review Event:**  
**Review Exemptions:** n/a  
**Review History:** RELEASED <08 JUL 2003 by maginmm>; APPROVED <30 JAN 2004 by ShawDG>  
**Review Markings:**

Margaret P. Grafeld  
Declassified/Released  
US Department of State  
EO Systematic Review  
05 JUL 2006

**Review Media Identifier:**  
**Review Referrals:** n/a  
**Review Release Date:** n/a  
**Review Release Event:** n/a  
**Review Transfer Date:**  
**Review Withdrawn Fields:** n/a  
**Secure:** OPEN  
**Status:** NATIVE  
**Subject:** n/a  
**TAGS:** PARM, NATO, (STRULAK, TADEUSZ)  
**To:** STATE  
SECDEF INFO NATO  
BONN  
LONDON  
USNMR SHAPE  
USCINCEUR

**Type:** TE

**Markings:** Margaret P. Grafeld Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 05 JUL 2006